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Abstract
In 2005 the French government launched a policy of competitiveness clusters,
giving subsidies for innovative projects managed locally and collectively by firms,
research centers and universities. This paper proposes an ex-ante analysis of the
outcome of the selection process that took place before the implementation of the
subsidies program, in order to assess whether the policy ended up in choosing winners
or losers. We first ask how the clusters have been selected, and then focus on the
selection of firms within the clusters, using export and productivity as a measure of
performance. Our main conclusion is that public authorities have chosen the winners
during the two-step selection procedure. Export premium, beyond what individual
characteristics would predict, is however most visible within the category of clusters
having no international ambition, where heterogeneity among firms is the largest.
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1 Introduction
Cluster initiatives are popular among policy makers. Policy makers have found arguments
in favor of subsidizing local networks of export-oriented innovative firms in the economic
literature on externalities and localized growth. On the one hand, the new trade theory
with heterogenous exporters (Melitz, 2003) highlights the existence of beachhead costs.
While the bulk of these costs is specific to the firm, some may be shared, in particular
when it comes to collecting information on remote or uneasy markets. On the other hand,
innovation and ideas can spread over space, but, as highlighted by Jaffe et al. (1993),
distance highly impedes such externalities. Both results tend to justify the geographical
clustering of innovative activities. Rosenthal and Strange (2004) survey the empirical
literature on agglomeration externalities and confirm the economic gains of clustering
economic activity. 1
In the French case, these arguments are reinforced by the fact that the country’s de-
ceiving export performance is often explained by the lack of medium size exporters, as
well as by the lack of cooperation between universities, research centers and industrial
firms. Mirroring these ideas, the French government launched in 2005 a three-year policy
of competitiveness clusters, which has been extended to 2009-2011. This policy is based
on a call for tender leading to financial subsidies for innovative projects managed collec-
tively by firms, research departments and universities. It aims at improving French firms’
performance thanks to radical innovations or upgrading in the quality of goods. Com-
pared to the first French clusters policy, the “Systèmes Productifs Locaux” (SPL) policy
started in 1998, the current competitiveness clusters scheme is very ambitious and quite
costly (1.5 billion euros for each of the three-year phases).
Evaluations of public policies aimed at clustering economic activity are very few. Mar-
tin, Mayer and Mayneris (2009) are the first to use firm-level data to analyze the effects
of a clusters policy (the French SPL program). Regarding the current competitiveness
clusters policy, it is probably too early to assess the impacts of public intervention on
firms’ long-run performance. Still, there is an aspect of the procedure that we want to
study. In the following, we perform an ex-ante evaluation of the outcome of the selection
1However, these are reported to be relatively small in magnitude.
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process that took place before the implementation of the subsidies program.
Since we were neither part of the administrative evaluations at the regional level, nor
experts in the commission grouping entrepreneurs and academics that proposed the final
list of clusters, we do not have information on the selection process per se. We accordingly
adopt a statistical approach to highlight the outcome of the patterns of the selection
process. The official selection procedure of the local actors that were to receive the
grants included two steps. First, national public authorities asked firms, research centers
and local authorities to submit proposals of sector-location pairs aimed at becoming the
clusters.2 Then, firms and research centers became members of the organization (generally
an association) managing the cluster and could apply for subsidies for specific projects.
As an example, a cluster was selected in the vicinity of Lyon, focusing on biotech (“Lyon
Biopole”). Then, 26 firms had become active members of this cluster in 2006. They could
apply to R&D tenders specifically oriented to labeled competitiveness clusters.
Our analysis thus investigates whether a specific pattern emerges from the selection
process. Is the competitiveness clusters policy a regional policy? In which case we would
find that the geographical selection has been very broad, in order to include in beneficiaries
laggard regions. On the one hand, the French clusters policy has indeed been criticized on
the grounds of its too limited selectivity. The number of clusters is large (66 clusters out
of 105 applications in 2005, 71 now), and not all selected clusters may be credible actors
in the world competition. On the other hand, a form of selectivity does appear when
taking export orientation as a criterion: the selected clusters contain 2,242 exporters,
which represent only 2 percent of the 111,960 exporters identified by the French customs
in 2004. Is the competitiveness clusters policy an industrial policy? This possibility
occurs when highlighting that firms are extremely heterogeneous and that the selectivity
depends strongly on the type of firms we consider: 21 percent of the firms in the first
percentile of exporters are ultimately active in the selected clusters. Hence one French
export champion out of five has been in fine grouped in the selected clusters.
Finally, did public authorities choose the worse or the best performing firms? The
empirical literature shows that industrial policies often target losers (see Beason and
Weinstein (1996), Martin, Mayer and Mayneris (2009)). The capacity of governments to
2There are some exceptions where different locations joined in a common sectoral tender.
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pick winners has thus been questioned in the theoretical literature on industrial policy.
For Corden (1974), revenue losses are affected by higher weights, relatively to revenue
gains, in social planners’ welfare function. According to Krueger (1990), there exists an
“identity bias” so that people care more about people they know than about the others; in
that sense, it would be easier to feel empathy for people who lose their jobs, because they
can be clearly identified, than for potential beneficiaries of future jobs, who are rather
unknown. Both stories provide an explanation to why governments have preferences
biased in favor of losers. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) adopt a different point of
view. They present a model in which it is not the governments that pick the losers
but the losers that capture industrial policies. Indeed, they show that in the presence
of sunk entry costs, the rents created by lobbying are more appropriable in declining
industries than in expanding industries. Firms operating in declining industries have thus
higher incentives than firms in expanding industries to lobby in order to obtain subsidies.
Another aspect of the question is linked to the design of industrial policies. Indeed, it
is also possible that the type of incentives given by public authorities shapes the pool of
beneficiaries: using a new economic geography model with heterogeneous firms, Baldwin
and Okubo (2006) show for example that starting from a core-periphery situation, a per-
firm subsidy aimed at encouraging production in the periphery tends to attract the least
efficient firms. Indeed, these firms are the ones that have the least to lose from leaving
the core region. These theoretical insights point at the complex interactions between the
preferences of governments, the lobbying of firms and the design of policies in determining
the beneficiaries of industrial policies.
In this respect, the French competitiveness clusters are interesting. Indeed, our inves-
tigation follows the steps of the official procedure. We first ask how the clusters have been
selected. Is there any evidence, within the considered sector, that the selected location
was actually grouping more efficient firms on average? We can consider that this first
step mainly reflects mechanisms at work at the local level. Then, we focus on the selec-
tion of firms within the clusters. Indeed, only some of the firms belonging to a selected
sector-location pair will become member of the organization in charge of the cluster and
apply for subsidies. Accordingly, the second question we ask is whether firms involved in
a competitiveness cluster are more efficient than other firms of the same sector. This se-
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cond stage will help us understand the kind of self-selection generated by the design of the
competitiveness clusters policy. The efficiency or the competitiveness of firms have many
interdependent dimensions. Provided that this policy aims at promoting competitiveness
in a context of increasing international competition, we choose to focus on the individual
export performance and the productivity of firms before they received the public support.
The French competitiveness clusters policy has grouped the selected clusters in three
categories reflecting their differences in terms of ambition. “Worldwide clusters” are at the
top of this ranking, followed by “potentially worldwide clusters” and “national clusters”.
We will see that these three categories of clusters are actually composed of very different
groups of firms. Our main conclusion is that the two-step selection procedure has helped
public authorities extract information on the winners to be picked. This process has
however been the most efficient for “national” clusters, where the heterogeneity of firms is
the largest.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The data and estimation procedure
are described in Section 2. Section 3 asks whether selected clusters exhibit on average
an export premium in their sector. Section 4 asks whether firms selected in clusters
exhibit an export premium, however without controlling for their individual characteristics
(controlled for in section 5). Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and method
There are three main data sources. First, we rely on individual exports as recorded by
the French customs.3 Each year, the data records exports for all firms located in France,4
at the 8-digit level of the CN8 classification of products, comprising more than 10,000
different categories of products.5 For the purpose of the paper, we aggregate the value
and the volume of exports at the firm level over all products and all destinations.
The second data source provides us with information on individual firm characteristics
3Individual custom data and business surveys were made available by the CEPII.
4More precisely, Customs record export at the company level. Companies may belong to groups. We
will however use the term ”firms“ by sake of simplicity, and control for ownership when necessary.
5Within the EU, French customs collect information on the product exported by firms when the
annual cumulated value of all shipments of a firm (in the previous year) is above 100,000 euros from 2001
onwards. This threshold was 99,100 euros in 2000 and 38,100 euros before. Regarding extra-eu exports,
all shipments above 1,000 euros are reported. CN8 holds for Combined Nomenclature 8-digit.
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such as employment, capital, value-added etc., which we use to compute firms’ productiv-
ity. These variables figure in the annual survey called “Enquêtes Annuelles d’Entreprise”
(EAE), however only for firms above 20 employees.
Last, we need information on which firm belongs to which cluster. The French Ministry
of Finance gave us access to this dataset, comprising 4,552 firms that are members of
competitiveness cluster in 2006. These firms have thus not necessarily received R&D
subsidies at that time; they are only allowed, as members of competitiveness clusters,
to apply to national R&D tenders specifically oriented to competitiveness clusters firms.
This dataset also contains information on the number of employees by firm.
The combination of the three datasets raises a series of issues. First, the EAE contains
both single and multiplant firms. In the latter case, the total employment recorded in
the EAE is the one for the firm as a whole.6 Second, not all firms export goods: some
may export services and some may not export at all, while exports of services are not
recorded by the customs. Last, small exporters, below 20 employees, are not present in
the EAE, even if they export goods. Out of the 111,960 exporting firms in the customs
dataset for the year 2004, 13,587 are present in the manufacturing EAE, of which 1,010
belong to at least one cluster. Recalling that a total of 2,242 exporters are reported in
all the clusters, the three restrictions end up in losing half of the exporters identified as
belonging to a cluster. We thus proceed with different samples corresponding to different
combinations of the restrictions. We first use the whole set of firms; then, in order to
control for productivity and size of the firms, we restrict the sample to the firms above
20 employees (hence recorded in the EAE); finally, as a robustness check, we verify that
our results hold when controlling for the number of plants and restricting to single-plant
firms.
For each firm and year, we compute the number of exported products and the number
of destination countries. We use the CEPII database on geographic data7 to obtain the
distance between France and each of destination country, and we compute a weighted ave-
rage distance of a firm’s destination countries (by weighting the distance to each country
by the share of the country in the firm’s total exports).
6We rely on the EAE restricted to manufacturing firms.
7The dataset “geo cepii” is available at http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
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Table 1: Share of competitiveness clusters in French export activity (firms)
Exporting firms ≥ 99 p. 90-99 p. 75-90 p. 50-75 p. 1-50 p.
Share in total... in clusters
nb of exporters 2.00 21.56 6.64 2.94 1.54 0.71
export value 27.35 35.59 9.05 3.21 1.74 0.79
Note: Firms are ordered in decreasing order of their individual export value. The table contains the shares
of different percentiles of the distribution of individual export value in total French exports. The values
in the first (second) row corresponds to the share of firms engaged in clusters in the column category in
the total number (export value) of French exporters.
We concentrate our analysis on the year 2004. There is one observation per firm in
our final sample. Table (1) informs on the selectivity of competitiveness clusters in terms
of firms. Only 2% of the total number of French exporters are present in competitiveness
clusters. Exporting firms in clusters however represent 27.35% of total French exports,
due to the high heterogeneity of exporting firms in terms of size. This heterogeneity is
mirrored in the distribution of individual export values: 21.56% of firms in the first top
percent of exporters have been selected in competitiveness clusters; they represent 35.59%
of the total value of exports realized by this category of exporters. The LIFI database,
available at INSEE, provides the ownership of individual firms and thus allows to draw
the perimeter of groups. We compute how groups are represented in clusters based on
the share of groups with at least one firm engaged in a cluster. The concentration of
observations is still striking when we control for ownership: Table (2) displays the same
information as in Table (1), however with clustered firms represented through the group to
which they belong to. It shows that groups represented in clusters account for 10.94% of
total French exporting groups, however for 75.01% of total exports by French groups. In
the first percentile of groups ordered according to their exported value, these percentages
are respectively 86% and 93.51%.
As explained in the introduction, clusters are grouped in three categories: category
1 refers to “worldwide competitiveness clusters”, category 2 “potentially worldwide com-
petitiveness clusters” and category 3, “national competitiveness clusters”. The full list of
clusters in 2006, by category, is provided in the Appendix (see Table (A-1)). In category
1, there are on average 114 firms in each cluster in 2006, with an average size of 2,500
employees (hence large enterprises). Less than half of these firms are direct exporters
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Table 2: Share of Competitiveness Clusters in French export activity (groups)
Exporting groups ≥ 99 p. 90-99 p. 75-90 p. 50-75 p. 1-50 p.
Share in total... in clusters
nb of exporters 10.94 86 33.11 18.09 10.02 3.79
export value 75.01 93.51 41.46 19.70 10.56 5.00
Note: Groups are ordered in decreasing order of their export value. The table contains the shares of
different percentiles of the distribution of group-level export value in total exports of French groups. The
values in the first (second) row corresponds to the share of groups engaged in clusters in the column
category in the total number (export value) of French exporting groups.
(the smallest firms may use intermediaries to export, however this is not visible in the
database). “Lyon biopole”, the biotech cluster already mentioned, is the smallest cluster
in this first category, with 28 firms involved, out of which 14 export goods. In category
2, the firms are of similar size (2,400 employees on average), and the clusters smaller
(90 firms on average). 40% of the firms are exporters and the smallest cluster, “Inno-
vations thérapeutiques”, comprises 29 firms (involved in the health sector). The third
category is highly heterogeneous. It consists of small clusters oriented toward innovation
(such as “innovative materials (MIPI)”, 18 firms) as well as large clusters for which the
innovative orientation is less obvious (427 firms in the meat sector “Viandes et produits
carnés”). Accordingly, the mean size of the firms is not significant in the latter case.
The export-orientation of “national competitiveness clusters” turns out to be greater than
for “worldwide competitiveness clusters”. The share of exporting firms is 55% against 47
and 40% in the other clusters types. It even rises up to 100 and 89% for the clusters
“aquatic products” and “innovative materials (MIPI)” respectively. Clusters appear to be
pretty outward-oriented : shares above 40% of exporting firms are 10 times higher than
the average share of 4% in France. When we restrict our attention to cluster firms that
are present in the manufacturing EAE (around 25% of the clusters firms) the ratio rises
further to 90%, much higher than the average for the EAE sample (69% of EAE firms
are exporters). Note that some firms, in worldwide clusters in particular, may belong to
groups resorting to foreign presence instead of exporting.
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3 Evaluating the selection of sector-location pairs
In this section we focus on the first step of the clusters’ selection. In November 2004
the French government published a national tender to label clusters. Out of the 105
received applications, 66 were selected: 6 “worldwide”, 10 “potentially worldwide” and 50
“national” clusters. Two types of subsidies are given to selected clusters: overhead costs
and subsidies for R&D projects. R&D subsidies are allocated regularly through national
tenders specifically implemented for competitiveness clusters members. We evaluate the
selection of sector-location pairs using data on firms that are respectively in and out of
the selected pairs. We compute performance variables at the sector-location level and
compare the performance of clusters to the performance of other pairs corresponding to
either the sector or the location criterion.8
We define locations included in clusters as all the départements in which there is at
least one firm pertaining to a selected cluster. We identify the sectors of the clusters
based on the NAF3 sector of firms that pertain to the clusters.9 Performance is assessed
in terms of exports and productivity.
Let us consider Lyon Biopole as an example. Our question is then whether biotech
firms located in the département “Rhône” (where Lyon is) were on average better per-
formers than other biotech firms in France. The issue at stake is whether the biotech
cluster was appropriately located in “Rhône”. To answer this question we consider all
firms located in “Rhône ” and in other French départements, that have biotech as their
main activity. We expect the performance of the biotech-Rhône pair to be higher than
any other biotech-location pair. We thus look for a locational advantage of Lyon in this
sector, i.e. a greater efficiency at producing and exporting biotech products.
The results of the estimations are shown in Table (3) using a cross section for 2004
(hence before the implementation of the policy). Average performance of sector-location
pairs (3635 in total) is regressed on dummies indicating whether the sector-location pair
is included in one of the three cluster categories (“Worldwide”, “Potentially Worldwide”
or “National”), controlling for sector dummies defined at the NAF3 digit level. Since
8Only 3635 sector-location pairs have positive exports out of a potential universe of 8178 (94 depart-
ments times 87 NAF3 sectors). Since 12 out of the 87 NAF3 sectors have no firms selected in a cluster,
259 out of the 3636 sector-location pairs included in the regressions below have no cluster-counterfactual.
9The NAF3 is the most granular available classification of main activities in France.
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Table 3: Competitiveness clusters and département/NAF3 digit average performance
(Customs+EAE dataset)
Dependent Variable: Performance
Model : Export Export Unit Number Number of Weighted Tfp
value quantity value products destinations distance
Best category: WCC 1.766a 0.971a 1.520a 19.479a 8.070a 0.228a 0.156a
(0.271) (0.328) (0.180) (5.056) (1.777) (0.046) (0.035)
Best category: PWCC 1.202a 1.296a 0.438a 11.596b 6.249a 0.142b 0.079a
(0.233) (0.253) (0.133) (5.573) (1.994) (0.063) (0.029)
Best category: NCC 1.407a 1.263a 0.548a 9.591a 5.644a 0.107b 0.080a
(0.118) (0.164) (0.083) (1.863) (0.951) (0.042) (0.016)
Number of
location-sector pairs 3635 3635 3635 3635 3635 3635 3635
R2 0.056 0.032 0.043 0.040 0.032 0.005 0.010
Note: Performance indicators are in Ln except the number of products and the number of destinations.
Fixed effects at the NAF3 digit level are introduced in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at
the NAF3 digit level.
some sector-location pairs may be included in several clusters, we categorize the clusters
assuming that “Worldwide” clusters (WCC) are better than “Potentially Worldwide” clus-
ters (PWCC), themselves better than “National” clusters (NCC), and we identify the “best
category”. Out of the 3635 sector-location pairs, 102 are included in at least one “World-
wide” cluster, 89 enter in at least one “Potentially Worldwide” cluster as best category
and 382 are included in at least one “National” cluster as best category.
Estimated parameters reported in the first column illustrate that firms in the three
types of clusters manage to export more, as compared to firms of the same NAF3 sec-
tor but belonging to other départements. This premium is the largest for “Worldwide”
clusters. More generally, we observe that the price-quality range of exported products,
the diversification of products, the diversification of markets, and the ability of exporting
to remote markets are greater on average in the selected locations within the considered
NAF3 sectors. The coefficient of 1.766 measured for “Worldwide” clusters when looking at
export value suggests that firms included in a “Worldwide” cluster export 5.84 (exp(1.766))
times more than firms of the same NAF3 sector but located in other départements.
The last column further indicates that the average productivity (of a given NAF3
sector) is greater in locations included in a cluster10. It is thus likely that above-average
10The location-sector average productivity is calculated thanks to firm-level TFP, estimated following
a GMM estimation of a production function. See section 5 for more details.
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export performances in the selected locations are explained by a higher productivity.
What these first results are telling us is that public authorities have managed to select
the right locations in the sectors they did prioritize, hence the most promising clusters. In
the départements the selected clusters belong to, firms were on average performing better
than those in the other départements, for a given sector. This however does not prove
that these clusters have ultimately grouped the champions in the selected sectors. Recall
that the firms themselves could decide to participate or not in a cluster. The next section
explores the effectiveness of this self-selection process of firms.
4 Firms in clusters show better export performance
In this section, we move from average sector-location performance to firm-level perfor-
mance. We concentrate on exporting firms (around 50% of clusters firms are exporters)
and ask whether conditionally on exporting selected firms in the selected clusters perform
better on average than firms outside the cluster. We use firm-level data and regress ex-
port performance variables (export value, export volume, number of exported products,
number of destination countries11, average distance of destination countries, unit value of
exports) of French exporters on their status of being selected within one cluster. We then
control for different variables (the category of cluster it belongs to, the fact that the firm
belongs to several competitiveness clusters). The difficulty is that exports are declared by
firms, not by plants. It is thus difficult to control for location-specific variables. Moreover,
some firms are present in several clusters. We accordingly include a dummy identifying
multi-cluster firms, since these firms have potentially specific performance.
Results on firm-level export value in 2004 are presented in Table 4. There are 111,960
observations. The coefficient on the cluster dummy in column 1, estimated without con-
trols, leads to a clear-cut conclusion: firms belonging to clusters were exporting more than
others, before entering into the competitiveness clusters. But remind that there has been
a selection of sector-location pairs by public authorities: we must accordingly control for
the sector of firms. From the Customs database we are able to identify the sector of each
11We will explain performance indicators expressed in Ln terms except the number of destinations and
the number of products in order to have a direct interpretation of the impact.
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Table 4: Competitiveness clusters and export value (Customs dataset)
Dependent Variable: ln export value
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Competitiveness Cluster 2.826a 2.526a 2.332a
(0.176) (0.107) (0.109)
Multi-competitiveness cluster firm 1.709a 1.743a
(0.238) (0.205)
Best category: WCC 3.001a 2.494a
(0.271) (0.182)
Best category: PWCC 2.313a 1.926a
(0.20) (0.228)
Best category: NCC 2.477a 2.371a
(0.138) (0.136)
Number of observations (firms) 111960 111960 111960 111960 111960
R2 0.023 0.088 0.089 0.088 0.089
Note: Sectoral fixed effects at the customs HS2 digit level are introduced in all columns but column 1.
Standard errors are clustered at the HS2 digit level.
firm at the HS2 digits level.12 Column 2 includes these sectoral fixed effects. As shown
by the significant and positive coefficient on the cluster dummy, our conclusion remains
valid, and hence assesses the individual premium within sectors.
In column 3, the problem of multi-cluster firms is tackled: the estimated coefficient on
the cluster dummy is slightly reduced, however the story is basically unchanged. Columns
4 and 5 relate to the three categories of clusters. We perform the same estimation allowing
for different coefficients for each category of cluster in column 4, and we control for multi-
cluster firms in column 5. From column 2 onwards, all regressions include sectoral fixed
effects at the HS2 digits level. Results show that for a given sector, firms selected in
a cluster export more than non selected firms. Note that the non-selected firms may
be located nearby selected firms: the criterion is the competitiveness cluster, not the
address. The premium associated to clusters is quite similar over all types of clusters, and
an extra-premium appears for multi-clustered firms.
The total value of exports is however a basic measure of export performance. We now
use the extra information available in the custom data to better characterize the export
performance. Four variables are considered: the unit value (a proxy for prices and quality),
12This level is chosen since it decomposes trade into 98 different sectors, a number similar to that (87)
proposed by the 87 NAF3 nomenclature.
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Table 5: Competitiveness clusters and export performance (Customs dataset)
Dependent Variable: Performance
Model : Exp. val. Exp. qty Unit val. Nb of prod. Nb of dest. Weighted
distance
Best category: WCC 2.494a 0.998a 1.957a 18.541a 10.463a 0.123b
(0.182) (0.212) (0.142) (2.908) (1.556) (0.053)
Best category: PWCC 1.926a 1.461a 0.839a 9.295a 8.564a 0.185a
(0.228) (0.314) (0.142) (2.546) (1.429) (0.063)
Best category: NCC 2.371a 2.056a 0.540a 10.216a 8.179a -0.136a
(0.136) (0.140) (0.105) (1.751) (0.678) (0.032)
Multi-competitiveness 1.743a 1.771a 0.296b 32.446a 14.887a 0.110
cluster firm (0.205) (0.281) (0.130) (7.115) (1.634) (0.069)
Number of obs. (firms) 111960 111552 111552 111960 111960 111960
R2 0.089 0.251 0.46 0.033 0.067 0.093
Note: Performance indicators are in Ln except the number of products and the number of destinations.
Fixed effects at the HS2 digit level are introduced in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at
the HS2 digit level.
the product diversification (number of different products exported by a firm), the market
diversification (number of destinations a firm is shipping to), and the ability to export to
more remote markets (average distance from France to the destination countries).
Table (5) displays the results for the various proxies of export performance in 2004.
Firms in clusters on average export more, and their products are positioned in a higher
range of price-quality; they also have a larger portfolio of exported products, shipped to
a wider set of markets. These general results are however quite different among types
of clusters. In “National” clusters, firms export more, but the quality premium is low
compared to “Worldwide” clusters. The same difference is observed for the number of
products and the number of destinations. Again, there is a premium for multi-cluster
firms on each of these dimensions. Last, we observe that firms in “National” clusters
exhibit a negative premium in terms of ability to export to remote markets: it appears
that firms in this group are not the “global players”.
To summarize, these results show that the firms subsidized through the French com-
petitiveness clusters policy exhibited better export performance than others before the
implementation of the policy: the French authorities selected firms having an ex ante
export premium – a proxy for efficiency. It thus appears that French authorities have
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managed through the two-stage selection process (sector-location pairs and then firms),
to extract information on the winners. The next section explores whether this informa-
tion of export premium goes beyond observable characteristics of firms, i.e. whether the
geographical clustering of firms by itself did add to the firm-specific premium (such as
productivity and size).
5 Controlling for individual characteristics eliminates
the competitiveness premium
We have shown in the previous section that firms participating in competitiveness clusters
overall perform better than others. The recent new trade theory literature on heteroge-
neous firms stresses that firms exhibiting better efficiency will also have better export
performances. Thus, the export premium observed for firms in clusters might simply re-
flect a selection bias: firms pertaining to clusters are in reality the most productive ones.
We need to check whether we continue to observe an export premium for firms in clusters
once their individual characteristics are controlled for. We use the manufacturing EAE
dataset to introduce controls for the characteristics of individual firms to answer this ques-
tion. Our sample is reduced to 13,857 exporting firms, of which 1,010 belong to a cluster.
To compute firm-level total factor productivity, we estimate a Cobb-Douglas production
function. To proceed, we need information on value-added, number of employees and
capital of the firms; we must consequently limit our exercise to the 13,510 exporting firms
present in the EAE, member or not of the clusters for which the statistics are available.
The estimation of production functions is subject to several drawbacks that we address
by using a GMM estimation procedure, following Griliches and Mairesse (1996) and Bond
(2002).
For sake of clarity we now consider that the value of exports is a good proxy of all
the dimensions of export performance previously considered (quality, number of products,
etc.), since we observed that all these variables are highly correlated. We regress the log
value of exports of firms in the EAE and compare our previous results with those from
this new sample comprising 13,510 observations. Column 1 of Table (6) controls for firms’
size and productivity.
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Table 6: Competitiveness clusters and export value (Customs + EAE dataset)
Dependent Variable: ln export value
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Competitiveness Cluster 0.509a 0.337a 0.312a
(0.116) (0.098) (0.104)
ln Number of employees 1.320a 1.269a 1.266a 1.271a 1.268a 1.274a 1.233a
(0.048) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.031) (0.031)
ln IV total factor 0.771a 0.772a 0.771a 0.773a 0.771a 0.738a 0.746a
productivity (0.117) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.057) (0.058)
Multi-competitiveness 0.204 0.290c 0.360b 0.441b
cluster firm (0.168) (0.167) (0.163) (0.180)
Best category is WCC 0.152 0.077 0.050 0.052
(0.226) (0.228) (0.201) (0.232)
Best category is PWCC 0.124 0.059 -0.013 0.042
(0.175) (0.178) (0.198) (0.222)
Best category is NCC 0.404a 0.382a 0.289a 0.229b
(0.139) (0.140) (0.086) (0.097)
Number of obs. (firms) 13510 13510 13510 13510 13510 13510 13510
R2 0.328 0.425 0.426 0.426 0.426 0.308 0.298
Note: Fixed effects at the NAF3 digit level are introduced from column 2 to 5. Fixed effects at the dé-
partement/NAF2 digit and at the département/NAF3 digit are respectively introduced in columns
6 and 7. Standard errors are clustered at the NAF3 digit level from column 1 to 5, at the départe-
ment/NAF2 digit level in column 6 and at the département/NAF3 digit level in column 7.
Fixed effects at the NAF3 digit level are included from column 2 to 5. Fixed effects
at the département/NAF2 digit and at the département/NAF3 digit are respectively in-
troduced in columns 6 and 7. Standard errors are clustered at the NAF3 digit level from
column 1 to 5, at the département/NAF2 digit level in column 6 and at the départe-
ment/NAF3 digit level in column 7.
The results obtained in the previous section are confirmed in column 1, but the mag-
nitude of the impact of the dummy “competitiveness cluster” is strongly reduced. This
does not come as a surprise since we consider larger firms, for which the dispersion of
export performance might be more limited. Moreover, we now control for the size and
the productivity of firms: the reduction of the export premium with respect to the previ-
ous section shows that bigger and more productive firms self-selected in competitiveness
clusters. Still, there is a positive premium on the value of individual exports for com-
petitiveness clusters firms, for a given size and productivity. When the sector the firm
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belongs to is controlled for in column 2, this positive impact shrinks. It is further reduced
in column 3 after controlling for multi-cluster firms. More interestingly, columns 4 to
7 reveal that the general positive impact of clusters is due to a composition effect. We
decompose the dummy “competitiveness cluster” into three different dummies according
to the category of cluster: only “National” clusters contribute positively and significantly
to the export performance of individual firms.
We thus conclude that clusters simply group the more efficient firms in the selected
sector. Controlling for this individual over-performance, nothing is left in terms of compet-
itive premium of individual firms, with the noticeable exception of “National” clusters.13
Concerning the latter type of clusters, of a highly heterogeneous nature, clustered firms
do exhibit an export premium beyond their individual characteristics. We report in Ta-
ble (A-2) in the Appendix results obtained using the same method applied to the growth
rate of exports between 2001 and 2004. As shown, results are similar.
Regarding the other dimensions of firm-level performance, table 7 shows that firms
belonging to “National” clusters also exhibit a productivity premium with respect to
firms in the same sector-department that are not members of a competitiveness clus-
ter. All three categories exhibit a premium in terms of unit-value, particularly large
for “Worldwide” competitiveness clusters. This tends to show that firms in competitive-
ness clusters produce and export higher quality goods than non-cluster firms in the same
sector-department. No particularly significant premium emerges for other dimensions of
export performance once firm-level size, productivity and presence in several clusters is
taken into account.
We must acknowledge that firms are not necessarily financially independent.14 They
often belong to a group where decisions made at the headquarter level impact the indi-
vidual export performance of the affiliates. The nationality of the group is also likely to
affect the performance of firms. Also, firms can be single- or multi-plant firms. If these
13Results available upon request show that this finding is robust to the exclusion of multi-plants firms
from the sample. To uncover the determinants of this self selection process, we also used a logit estimation
to explain whether a firm participates or not to a “National” cluster based on its individual characteris-
tics. Results showed that self-selected firms are larger, probably due to the sunk costs associated with
applying, or due to better access to information and networking. These firms are also more productive,
or equivalently more export oriented. Being a member of a domestic group increases the probability of
entering into a cluster.
14Remind that French customs record exports at the company level.
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Table 7: Competitiveness clusters and export performance-Firms controls (Cus-
toms+EAE)
Dependent Variable: Performance
Model : Export Export Unit. Number. Number of. Weighted Tfp
value quantity value. of products destinations distance
Best category is WCC 0.052 -1.025a 1.377a 7.042 3.410 0.091 0.025
(0.232) (0.326) (0.205) (5.746) (2.998) (0.086) (0.059)
Best category is PWCC 0.042 -0.210 0.359c 9.917 2.336 0.184c 0.078
(0.222) (0.296) (0.187) (7.530) (2.756) (0.102) (0.054)
Best category is NCC 0.229b -0.037 0.309a 1.322 0.618 -0.006 0.052b
(0.097) (0.112) (0.079) (1.815) (0.833) (0.040) (0.022)
Multi-competitiveness 0.441b 0.256 0.367b 25.479a 10.143a -0.002 0.119b
cluster firm (0.180) (0.212) (0.171) (7.938) (3.177) (0.080) (0.047)
ln Number of employees 1.233a 1.351a -0.007 10.977a 7.255a 0.063a 0.049a
(0.031) (0.039) (0.021) (0.843) (0.239) (0.009) (0.006)
ln IV total factor 0.746a 0.617a 0.154a 6.052a 3.717a 0.071a
productivity (0.058) (0.064) (0.038) (0.694) (0.430) (0.021)
N 13510 13500 13500 13510 13510 13510 13510
R2 0.298 0.242 0.015 0.217 0.261 0.008 0.014
Note: Fixed effects at the département/Naf 3 digit level are introduced in all columns. Performance
indicators are in Ln except the number of products and the number of destinations. Standard errors
are clustered at the département/Naf 3 digit level.
variables are correlated to the competitiveness clusters membership, they could explain
the premium observed for “National” clusters. We can control for the different dimen-
sions of the selection problem by merging our data with information on (domestic and
international) financial relations of firms. These are provided by a database named LIFI,
constructed by the French national statistical institute. We thus verify in Table (A-3) in
Appendix that after controlling for these dimensions, we observe an export performance
premium only for “National” clusters.15 Our results appear also robust to the inclusion
of firm-level wage. We finally obtained very similar results when using the same strategy
applied to the growth rate between 2001 and 2004. While Table (A-4) covers different
measures of performance (value, quantity, unit value, product diversification, market di-
versification, distance to destination countries and TFP), Table (A-5) concentrates on
export value and adds firm-level controls. Both confirm an export performance premium
only for “National” clusters.
15The scope of the firm, as proxied by the number of plants, has no statistically significant effect. On
the contrary, belonging to a group increases the export performance, and this effect is larger when the
group is foreign-owned. Depending of the structure of the group however, this impact can be magnified or
reduced. Finally, a group focused on the French market (with a large number of domestic affiliates) will
be less pro-export, while a group focused on international markets is shown to have the opposite effect.
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6 Conclusion
Our results show than in spite of the large number of clusters subsidized through the
French policy of competitiveness clusters, this policy has been quite selective: only 2% of
manufacturing exporters are involved in a competitiveness cluster. This selection is the
combination of a selection of clusters (a sector in a location) combined with a self-selection
of individual firms applying for subsidies from the selected clusters.
The outcome of this two-stage process is clear-cut. The first stage ended up with
clusters comprising firms that are on average better performing within their sector. This
is true for the three types of clusters. Still, with the exception of “National” clusters, such
export premiums are fully explained by individual characteristics of firms: the geographi-
cal clustering of firms by itself did not add to this individual premium. Winners have thus
been picked only in “National” clusters which were the more heterogenous. Regarding the
second stage, the self selection has actually revealed information to public authorities and
helped picking the winners. On the contrary, no performance premium is left for firms
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Table A-1: Descriptive statistics on competitiveness clusters
Name Category #
firms
# exporting Share of Size of firms Size of exporting firms
firms exporting
firms
Mean Median Mean Median
A.E.S.E. 1 365 160 0.44 1035 43 2080 143
Lyon Biopole 1 28 14 0.50 916 46 1624 316
Minalogic 1 47 34 0.72 3623 143 4523 148
MédiTech Santé 1 53 17 0.32 265 12 757 143
SYSTEM@TIC Paris-région 1 133 65 0.49 5310 43 10660 696
Solutions Communicantes
Sécurisées
1 59 33 0.56 3620 57 5390 73
Mean 1 114 54 0.47 2462 57 4172 253
AXELERA Chimie-environnement
Lyon
2 63 36 0.57 1232 99 1885 239
Image, Multimédia et Vie
Numérique - CAP DIGITAL
2 228 47 0.21 864 15 3433 49
Images & Réseaux 2 108 36 0.33 1664 23 4545 78
Industries et Agroressources 2 50 34 0.68 7500 150 10221 174
Innovations thérapeutiques 2 29 15 0.52 208 12 397 182
Mer Bretagne 2 135 59 0.44 1356 18 2727 35
Mer, sécurité et sûreté 2 141 47 0.33 518 23 1053 115
Moveo 2 43 27 0.63 3779 329 5500 994
Pôle i-Trans 2 46 29 0.63 6463 219 9625 340
Végétal spécialisé 2 53 30 0.57 164 16 200 77
Mean 2 90 36 0.40 2375 90 3959 228
ARVE industrie 3 137 94 0.69 118 25 156 39
Auto haut de gamme 3 45 28 0.62 2302 55 596 285
Biothérapies 3 39 11 0.28 180 10 370 35
Capenergies 3 97 31 0.32 1965 13 5227 164
Cosmetic valley 3 103 51 0.50 142 24 215 43
DERBI Energie renouvelable bâti-
ment industrie
3 57 21 0.37 587 20 1283 63
ELOPSYS 3 20 6 0.30 819 20 1902 765
EMC2 3 57 34 0.60 777 69 1192 99
EnRRDIS 3 17 9 0.53 8979 444 15843 1232
Fibres naturelles Grand Est 3 24 15 0.63 269 106 339 147
Filière produits aquatiques 3 7 7 1.00 238 117 238 117
Filière équine 3 48 13 0.27 40 4 110 20
Gestion des risques et vulnérabilités
des territoir
3 81 27 0.33 3429 37 8065 942
Imaginov 3 121 11 0.09 92 4 50 23
Industries du commerce 3 38 19 0.50 3359 64 6575 2142
Innovation dans les céréales 3 21 11 0.52 262 111 164 117
L’aliment de demain 3 116 76 0.66 274 54 362 91
Logistique Seine-Normandie 3 58 30 0.52 9759 222 18568 368
Lyon Urban Truck & Bus 2015 3 33 19 0.58 987 77 1637 349
MAUD Matériaux à usage domes-
tique
3 15 13 0.87 1286 188 1477 357
Matériaux Innovants, Produits In-
telligents (MIPI)
3 18 16 0.89 1118 192 650 192
Mobilité et transports avancés 3 34 24 0.71 11233 1468 15397 1873
Nutrition santé longévité 3 29 18 0.62 253 26 397 99
Orpheme 3 111 53 0.48 54 14 89 38
Parfums, arômes, senteurs, saveurs 3 46 32 0.70 384 31 521 47
Photonique 3 58 37 0.64 495 14 725 32
Pin maritime du futur 3 56 37 0.66 110 27 144 47
Prod’Innov 3 60 42 0.70 397 55 552 183
Pôle agronutrition en milieu tropi-
cal
3 13 3 0.23 78 60 93 125
Pôle cancer-bio-santé 3 47 18 0.38 707 28 1215 40
Pôle céramique 3 50 37 0.74 144 45 184 72
Pôle des microtechniques 3 390 253 0.65 69 14 99 21
Pôle enfant 3 38 27 0.71 186 102 230 150
Pôle européen d’innovation Fruits
et Légumes
3 68 35 0.51 225 26 287 49
Pôle génie civil Ouest 3 35 12 0.34 669 292 1047 656
Pôle nucléaire Bourgogne 3 55 33 0.60 4188 70 6441 96
Pôle plasturgie 3 101 66 0.65 167 43 237 83
Q@LIMED Agropolis 3 20 12 0.60 1226 31 2002 98
Route des lasers 3 47 24 0.51 3354 42 5859 171
SPORALTEC 3 18 14 0.78 1207 134 1475 185
Sciences et Systèmes de l’Energie
Electrique
3 44 29 0.66 3767 57 5316 76
Techtera 3 39 32 0.82 124 48 138 50
Transactions électroniques
sécurisées
3 58 22 0.38 3851 27 9196 204
Trimatec 3 42 24 0.57 3322 76 5716 421
UP-TEX 3 51 39 0.76 1180 70 1483 99
VIAMECA 3 40 26 0.65 3854 71 5482 118
Viandes et produits carnés 3 427 186 0.44 164 36 318 91
Ville et mobilité durables 3 33 12 0.36 11141 82 33226 262
Vitagora 3 83 53 0.64 509 71 343 81
Véhicule du futur 3 228 180 0.79 1044 143 1275 182
Mean 3 69 38 0.55 1822 101 3290 265
Note: Category 1 is “worldwide competitiveness clusters”, category 2 is “potentially worldwide competi-
tiveness clusters” and category 3 is “national competitiveness clusters”. Statistics on the share of
exporters are computed based on the confrontation of the customs dataset and the competitiveness
cluster data from the French Ministry of Finance.
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Table A-2: Competitiveness clusters and export value growth (Customs+EAE)
Dependent Variable: Δ ln export
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number of employees in 2001 0.246a 0.261a 0.261a 0.262a 0.261a 0.266a 0.268a
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022)
IV total factor productivity in 2001 0.199a 0.223a 0.223a 0.223a 0.223a 0.223a 0.267a
(0.060) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.036) (0.043)
ln export value in 2001 -0.192a -0.220a -0.220a -0.220a -0.220a -0.217a -0.234a
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Competitiveness cluster (CC) 0.178a 0.145a 0.139a
(0.043) (0.043) (0.047)
Multi-competitiveness cluster firm 0.051 0.075 0.151 0.182c
(0.081) (0.092) (0.095) (0.111)
Best category is WCC 0.088 0.068 -0.026 0.071
(0.146) (0.160) (0.146) (0.176)
Best category is PWCC 0.095 0.079 0.011 0.044
(0.096) (0.099) (0.136) (0.156)
Best category is NCC 0.163a 0.157a 0.159a 0.195a
(0.057) (0.057) (0.052) (0.056)
N 10812 10812 10812 10812 10812 10812 10812
R2 0.096 0.122 0.122 0.123 0.123 0.106 0.115
Note: Fixed effects at the NAF3 digit level are introduced from column 2 to 5. Fixed effects at the dé-
partement/NAF2 digit and at the département/NAF3 digit are respectively introduced in columns
6 and 7. Standard errors are clustered at the NAF3 digit level from column 1 to 5, at the départe-
ment/NAF2 digit level in column 6 and at the département/NAF3 digit level in column 7.
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Table A-3: Competitiveness clusters and export performance premium with controls (Cus-
toms + EAE)
Dependent Variable: ln export value
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Best category is WCC 0.052 0.047 0.043 0.049 -0.111 0.053 0.033
(0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.228) (0.217) (0.206) (0.206)
Best category is PWCC 0.042 0.035 0.028 0.035 -0.059 0.008 -0.012
(0.222) (0.223) (0.222) (0.220) (0.217) (0.213) (0.212)
Best category is NCC 0.229b 0.226b 0.224b 0.208b 0.173c 0.189b 0.181b
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.096) (0.094) (0.089) (0.089)
Multi-competitiveness cluster firm 0.441b 0.446b 0.445b 0.417b 0.370b 0.405b 0.391b
(0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.185) (0.179) (0.168) (0.167)
Number of employees 1.233a 1.229a 1.223a 1.224a 1.245a 0.949a 0.939a
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029)
IV total factor productivity 0.746a 0.746a 0.744a 0.746a 0.357a 0.256a 0.257a
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.053) (0.049) (0.049)
1 if nb of plants 1 -0.013 -0.013 -0.020 -0.023 -0.040 -0.039
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.045) (0.045)
1 if firm belongs to a group 0.067
(0.050)
1 if firm belongs to a domestic group 0.010 0.535a 0.589a 0.480a 0.476a
(0.061) (0.088) (0.088) (0.086) (0.086)
1 if firm belongs to a foreign group 0.140b 0.693a 0.764a 0.615a 0.615a
(0.068) (0.111) (0.108) (0.102) (0.102)
ln (nb of domestic affiliates in the group+1) -0.365a -0.366a -0.339a -0.337a
(0.054) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053)
ln (nb of foreign affiliates in the group+1) 0.204a 0.154b 0.171a 0.167a
(0.059) (0.061) (0.056) (0.057)
ln (Firm’s average wage) 1.714a 1.474a 1.477a
(0.125) (0.101) (0.102)
Total imports of the firm 0.155a 0.155a
(0.006) (0.006)
ln (Firm’s subsidies) 0.010b
(0.004)
N 13510 13510 13510 13510 13499 13499 13499
R2 0.298 0.299 0.299 0.303 0.325 0.395 0.396
Note: Fixed effects at the département/NAF3 digit level are introduced in all columns. Standard errors
are clustered at the département/NAF3 digit.
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Table A-4: Competitiveness clusters and export performance growth 2001-2004 (Customs
and EAE)
Dependent Variable: Δ Performance
Model : ln Exp. val. ln Exp. qty. ln Unit val. Nb. prod. Nb dest. ln Dist. ln
Best category is WCC 0.071 -0.224 0.360a -0.027 0.066 0.010 -0.
(0.176) (0.222) (0.118) (0.109) (0.071) (0.086) (0.
Best category is PWCC 0.044 -0.067 0.055 0.056 -0.031 0.111 0.
(0.156) (0.193) (0.134) (0.175) (0.111) (0.082) (0.
Best category is NCC 0.195a 0.133c 0.129b 0.020 0.121b -0.003 0.0
(0.056) (0.070) (0.055) (0.059) (0.052) (0.035) (0.
Multi-competitiveness cluster firm 0.182c 0.119 0.018 0.136 -0.007 -0.074 0.
(0.111) (0.146) (0.098) (0.102) (0.068) (0.062) (0.
Number of employees in 2001 0.268a 0.340a 0.018 0.037c 0.087a 0.029a 0.0
(0.022) (0.027) (0.013) (0.019) (0.026) (0.007) (0.
IV total factor productivity in 2001 0.267a 0.251a 0.126a 0.039 0.101b 0.043b -0.
(0.043) (0.051) (0.032) (0.033) (0.040) (0.019) (0.
ln export value in 2001 -0.234a
(0.012)
ln export qty in 2001 -0.246a
(0.013)
ln unit value in 2001 -0.344a
(0.013)
Nb exported products in 2001 -0.007a
(0.001)
Nb destinations in 2001 -0.014a
(0.001)
Ln of weighted average distance -0.349a
(0.011)
N 10812 10807 10807 10812 10812 10812 10
R2 0.115 0.121 0.169 0.018 0.028 0.177 0.
Note: Fixed effects at the département/NAF3 digit level are introduced in all columns. Standard errors
are clustered at the département/NAF3 digit level.
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Table A-5: Competitiveness clusters and export performance growth 2001-04 (Cus-
toms+EAE)
Dependent Variable: Δ ln export
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Best category is WCC 0.071 0.071 0.072 0.072 0.059 0.112 0.108
(0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.174) (0.166) (0.166)
Best category is PWCC 0.044 0.043 0.041 0.046 0.032 0.031 0.025
(0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.157) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156)
Best category is NCC 0.195a 0.194a 0.194a 0.192a 0.186a 0.184a 0.182a
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056)
Multi-competitiveness cluster firm 0.182c 0.182c 0.182c 0.175 0.167 0.183c 0.178
(0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.111) (0.110) (0.110)
ln Number of employees in 2001 0.268a 0.266a 0.263a 0.264a 0.273a 0.211a 0.208a
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
ln IV total factor productivity in 2001 0.267a 0.266a 0.265a 0.266a 0.196a 0.169a 0.171a
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041)
ln firm exports in 2001 -0.234a -0.234a -0.234a -0.235a -0.240a -0.272a -0.272a
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
1 if nb of plants 1 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.002
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
1 if firm belongs to a group 0.007
(0.031)
1 if firm belongs to a domestic group -0.014 0.075 0.090 0.079 0.077
(0.038) (0.062) (0.061) (0.063) (0.063)
1 if firm belongs to a foreign group 0.033 0.104 0.120c 0.10 0.10
(0.043) (0.070) (0.070) (0.068) (0.068)
ln (nb of domestic affiliates in the group+1) -0.063c -0.068c -0.070c -0.069c
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
ln (nb of foreign affiliates in the group+1) 0.045 0.041 0.052 0.051
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
ln (Firm’s average wage) 0.280a 0.235a 0.236a
(0.077) (0.071) (0.071)
ln firm imports 0.057a 0.057a
(0.005) (0.005)
ln firm subsidies 0.003
(0.003)
N 10812 10812 10812 10812 10803 10803 10803
R2 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.116 0.118 0.143 0.143
Note: Fixed effects at the département/NAF3 digit level are introduced in all columns. Standard errors
are clustered at the département/NAF3 digit level.
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